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1 Introduction
Over the last two decades we have witnessed a far-reaching wave of reforms in Social
Security Systems around the world, particularly in developed economies, due to the
growing financial imbalances emerging into their systems. The nature of pay-as-you-
go systems, where contributions are used to pay benefits, require them to be periodically
adjusted. Otherwise, account deficits place pension systems in a situation of vulnerability
that can lead to question the intergenerational solidarity in which are based on.
Financial imbalances can be caused by a variety of reasons. Recently, the main factors
driving the reforms mainly include a severe economic crisis and an acute demographic
pressure. On the one hand, the deterioration of the economic situation negatively impacts
the short-term stability of the systems, lowering contributions (due to higher unemploy-
ment rates and reduction of salaries) while increasing benefit payments. On the other
hand, the demographic context, with a decreasing ratio of workers to pensioners, raises
benefit costs relative to contributions.
Generally, recent pension reforms tend to focus on the benefit side more than on the
contribution side. Administrations consider contribution levels to be already in the high
range of possible values, and increasing the tax burden is not the favoured option in the
long term because of its unpopularity, the limited room for increases and the potential
loss of competitiveness it may cause. Also, funding increasing benefits through debt is
also a limited alternative if it must be consistent with a long-term fiscal sustainability.
Reforms adopt a wide range of forms, the simplest and most popular being the modi-
fication of the parameters of the system. Increasing the retirement age, changing the
eligibility conditions to access an old-age pension (for example, increasing the necessary
number of years of contributions for eligibility), tightening the minimum requirements for
early retirement in order to prolong the working life (and raise the effective retirement
age), or increasing the number of years used in the computation of the base pension are
common parametric modifications. The popularity of parametric changes lies in their
ease of implementation, and in the fact that they require less political consensus. On
the contrary, structural changes, such as the transformation from a pay-as-you-go to a
capitalization or funded system, are not possible without a wide political consensus.
More sophisticated reforms include the adoption of the so-called “automatic balance
mechanisms” (Diamond, 2004; Vidal-Melia´ et al., 2009). An automatic balance mechan-
ism induces changes in a pension system based on the information provided by external
demographic and economic factors. They take as input significant economic magnitudes
such as growth rate of real wages, GDP variations or population life expectancy in order
to stabilize the system. One of the main advantages of these mechanisms is that they
liberate political institutions to decide over the system, which monitors and adjusts itself
without external intervention.
Generally, these mechanisms are based on actuarially fair principles, and present a dir-
ect link between contributions and benefits at individual level. To restore the financial
equilibrium of the system, the mechanisms tends to act on the benefit side rather than
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affecting the contribution rates. By triggering the balance mechanism, the system adjusts
itself and re-establishes its equilibrium according to a solvency or sustainability indicator.
Although regulated automatic balance mechanisms tend to rely on equilibrium equations,
the idea of controlling the pension system throught the modification of some selected vari-
ables has also been proposed in the past using more complex dynamic control techniques.
For example, using optimal control techniques in a deterministic setting, Haberman and
Zimbidis (2002) introduce the idea of a contingency fund for a pay-as-you-go pension
system to absorb the short-term fluctuations in mortality or fertility patterns. The main
utility of the fund is that it allows us to smooth the optimal path of the control vari-
ables, which in their model are the contribution rate and the age of eligibility for normal
retirement.
The fund approach has also been considered in fully-funded pension systems relying on
capitalization, as in Vigna and Haberman (2001) in a discrete time-setting, or in Devolder
et al. (2003) in a continuous-time setting. Both models permits the fund to be invested in
a risky and a riskless asset, following Merton (1975), while searching optimal investment
policies for defined contribution plans. Similar approach in defined contribution plans is
used in Josa-Fombellida and Rinco´n-Zapatero (2001) and Josa-Fombellida and Rinco´n-
Zapatero (2004), which compute optimal contribution rates and investment strategies in
a continuous-time stochastic framework while minimizing both the contribution rate risk
and the solvency risk along the lines of Haberman and Sung (1994).
Although the fund method is employed in both capitalization and pay-as-you-go systems,
the role of the fund is different in the two cases. In the case of capitalization, the goal is to
accumulate savings to pay future obligations. Pay-as-you-go systems, in contrast, do not
require accumulation of funds, so funds are collected to satisfy immediate payments to
beneficiaries. Nevertheless, funds can also be collected in advance to provide a liquidity
cushion in times of necessity, as it may happen in times of economic crisis where lowering
contributions are insufficient to cover benefits, or to build up a large reserve in anticipation
of an adverse demographic scenario.
The focus of governments to balance pension systems by controlling pension expendit-
ure has led regulators to replace the usual indexing of pensions to the Consumer Price
Index (CPI) for new methodologies. These new methods take into account economic
and demographic variables to automatically establish a value of existing pensions so that
expenditure matches available funds. For example, this is the case of the 2013 Spanish’s
pension reform, where each year the value of existing pensions is indexed according to
the result of a formula meant to ensure a budget equilibrium (a comprehensive analysis
of this aspect of the Spanish reform can be found in Roch et al., 2017).
This interest has led researchers to build mathematical models to optimally control the
indexing of pensions. God´ınez-Olivares, Boado-Penas, and Haberman (2016) include
the indexing of pensions as a key variable for controlling the system in a discrete-time
nonlinear dynamic programming approach, in order to guarantee a certain liquidity level.
Also, in God´ınez-Olivares, Boado-Penas, and Pantelous (2016), the method is extended
to restore the long-term sustainability of the system.
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In this paper we aim to expand the related literature on optimal pension indexing by
extending its use as a control variable in a pay-as-you-go pension system in a stochastic
continuous-time framework. According to our proposal, the aim of the government is to
find an adequate level of pension indexing without compromising the financial equilibrium
of the system, while maintaining fixed the level of contribution rates and other structural
parameters.
Following the fund approach, the budget equilibrium is stabilized maintaining the pension
fund close to a target level. Given the liquidity aspect of the pension fund in pay-as-you-
go systems, opposite to the accumulation of funds to match actuarial liabilities, a stable
value of the fund implies that income and expenditure must be closely related.
The main advantage of this approach is it that allows us to obtain closed form solutions
for the optimal indexing paths. Our model contemplates the possibility of investing the
fund assets both in a riskless and a risky asset, modelled by a continuous-time stochastic
process. We further generalize the model allowing the fund to be invested in n risky
assets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3 finds
the optimal indexing paths for different market structures. In Section 4, a numerical
example is presented to illustrate the use of the model. Finally, Section 5 concludes the
paper.
2 Mathematical model
In this section we define the general framework and the variables that conform the pension
model. Later, in Section 3, we will consider particular cases of this general framework, re-
stricting the universe of possible investment assets, in order to facilitate the interpretation
and computation of the optimal indexing paths.
The most fundamental element of the model is the pension fund. It contains the assets
hold by the sponsor (in this case, the government) necessary to satisfy present payments
to the beneficiaries of the system. Its basic sources of income are dedicated tax revenues,
generally in the form of Social Security contributions, and, to a lesser extent, cash-flows
and capital gains generated by the invested reserves. Other sources of income are also
accepted, as direct transfers from the state or federal budget to the fund originated from
unrelated tax revenues.
Current assets of the fund are used to pay obligations, so benefit payments are drawn from
the fund. The pension system defined in this model is of the defined benefit type, which
means that benefits corresponding to each beneficiary are determined according a set of
rules established in advance. Revenue collection and payments take place continuously,
and decisions related to the system are made for a finite planning horizon, in the interval
[0, T ].
Let F (t) be the value of the assets in the fund at time t. The fund acts as a state variable
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of the model and follows a continuous-time stochastic process, with a continuous flow of
money entering and leaving the fund. Income from contributions increase the value of
the fund, and payments to the beneficiaries reduce its value.
At each moment in time, the remaining funds can be invested in a riskless asset and m
risky assets. The riskless asset, denoted by S0(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ ∞, grows at a continuously
compounded interest rate and therefore evolves according to
dS0(t) = rS0(t)dt, S0(0) = 1,
being r > 0 the constant rate of interest. The risky assets are denoted by S1(t), . . . , Sm(t)
and verify
dSi(t) = µiSi(t)dt+
m∑
j=1
σijSi(t)dWj(t), Si(0) = si, i = 1, . . . ,m. (1)
Parameters µi and σij are assumed to be positive constants, and the interest rate r is
assumed to be strictly smaller than the mean rates of return of the risky assets, so r ≤ µi
for all i = 1, . . . ,m. The vector W(t) = (W1(t), . . . ,Wm(t))
T is an m-dimensional stand-
ard Wiener process defined on the filtered probability space (Ω,F , {Ft}t≥0, P ), where
{Ft}t≥0 is the completion of the filtration σ{W(s) | 0 ≤ s ≤ t}. We assume that the
filtered probability space satisfies the usual ‘technical’ conditions of completeness and
right-continuity. Bold font denotes vectors.
We denote by αi(t) the fraction of the fund invested in each risky asset, i = 1, . . . ,m, so
that αi(t)F (t) is the total amount invested in the risky asset i. The risky assets do not
need to be particular assets, they can be broad categories or classes of risky assets. The
fraction of the portfolio invested in the riskless asset at time t is 1−∑mi=1 αi(t).
The trading strategy α(t) = (α1(t), α2(t), . . . , αm(t))
T is a measurable process adapted to
the filtration {Ft}t≥0, so that anticipation of future values of the random variables is not
permitted. Short selling is allowed, as well as borrowing at the riskless rate of interest.
Negative values of αi(t) indicate short positions in the risky assets. If 1−
∑m
i=1 αi(t) takes
a negative value, then the fund borrows at interest rate r to support the long position in
the risky assets.
As time goes on, the pension system funds expenditure from contributions and possibly
from other sources of income. Total income to the system is given by a deterministic
function I(t), which may depend on factors such as population wages or contribution
rate. Although some pension models take as a control variable the contribution rate
of the system, recent reforms have not generally contemplated its modification, so we
consider all income to be exogenously determined.
Total expenditure in the pension system is denoted by G(t, g(t)). Clearly, the main source
of expenditure is the direct transfer to beneficiaries. In a pay-as-you-go system, benefits
of each worker at the moment of retirement can be computed either using a flat rate
principle or be earnings (salary) related. Later, benefits are indexed at a factor g(t). In
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the model proposed, the index factor is a decision variable that controls the amount spent
in benefits. The index process g(t) is a measurable adapted process with respect to the
filtration {Ft}t≥0 that verifies∫ t
0
|g(s)|2ds <∞ a.s., for every t <∞.
Moreover, total expenditure should also include other costs required to run the pension
system, such as those associated to cover employee, leasing and other administrative
expenses.
Changes in the value of assets, contributions and payment of benefits provoke changes in
the value of the fund. Therefore, the change in the fund level is given by
dF (t) =
(
n∑
i=1
αi(t)
dSi(t)
Si(t)
)
F (t) +
(
1−
m∑
i=1
αi(t)
)
F (t)
dS0(t)
S0(t)
+ (I(t)−G(t, g(t)))dt,
so that the fund satisfies
dF (t) =
(
rF (t) +
m∑
i=1
αi(t)(µi − r)F (t) + I(t)−G(t, g(t))
)
dt+
m∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
αi(t)σijF (t)dWj(t)
(2)
with initial condition F (0) = F0.
Depending on the inflow and outflow of capital and the value of the investment portfolio,
the value of the fund at every moment t takes a positive or a negative sign. A negative
value of F (t) means an instant deficit that must be financed.
While controlling the evolution of the pension system, the government aims to index
pensions cumulative close a target level gc during the planning horizon. The value of
gc can be set to maintain the nominal value of pensions, can be related to an economic
indicator like expected CPI (to maintain the real value of pensions) or can be related to
any other value or indicator that may be considered desirable.
At the same time, the government aims that the level of the fund is close to a target
level Fc. In a regular defined benefit pension plan, the value of Fc corresponds to the
actuarial liabilities of the plan. However, in a regular pay-as-you-go system, the sponsor
uses current income to pay for current expenditure, so the value of the fund relates to
liquidity objectives. In this sense, the target fund value could represent some months
of future benefit payments, a percentage of the GDP or a percentage of total insured
wages, for example. To simplify notation, and without loss of generality, in the following
expressions we denote gc and Fc as constant terms, but they can be functions of time as
long as they are exogenously determined.
In these conditions, the sponsor does not want the fund to reach negative values, which
would imply liquidity problems, but at the same time does not want to accumulate funds
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at the expense of a lower pension indexing. Thus, the sponsor aims to apply increasing
values of the index factor, for a higher satisfaction of its pensioners, but not a a level that
can provoke budget imbalances.
The quadratic loss function reflects the described equilibrium. Deviations of the two
variables from their target levels from above or below are equally penalized.
Analytically, the problem is
min
{g(t),α1(t),...,αm(t)}
EF0
[∫ T
0
e−ρt
(
θ
(
g(t)− gc
gc
)2
+ (1− θ)
(
F (t)− Fc
Fc
)2)
dt
]
(3)
subject to (2), where EF0 denotes the expectation conditional to an initial value of the
fund F0. The deviation of the variables g(t) and F (t) with respect to its corresponding
target levels gc and Fc is defined in relative terms, to compensate for the very different
magnitude of the two variables.
The parameter θ (0 < θ ≤ 1) is a weight that allows the sponsor to ponder the importance
of each objective. Therefore, a value of the parameter θ equal to 0.5 in expression (3)
assigns the same importance to relative deviations of g(t) and F (t) with respect to its
target levels. If the sponsor, for example, considers more important during the planning
horizon to minimize the relative deviations of g(t) with respect to its target level than
those of F (t), it can increase the value of θ from θ = 0.5 up to θ = 1.
The weighted relative deviations are discounted at a positive discount rate ρ. The higher
the value of ρ, the more importance is given to the present. The rate ρ is constant during
the whole planning horizon.
3 Optimal pension control
Once the basic elements of the model are established, we aim to find a solution to the
problem defined in (3) subject to (2). With the purpose of clarifying the necessary steps
to find the solution, in this section we consider three particular cases of the problem, in
increasing complexity. Starting with a market where only one riskless asset exists, we
then extend the universe of available assets with one risky asset. Finally, we discuss the
general case where an arbitrary number of risky assets is available for investing.
The following three subsections contain the discussion of the particular cases. We opt to
maintain the notation of the value and auxiliary functions without distinction between
cases. Being clear that the characterization of the functions is confined to the corres-
ponding problem in each subsection, we avoid the use of subscripts or superscripts in the
solutions to distinguish between cases, which hopefully clarifies the exposition of results.
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3.1 No risky asset case
We start by considering the case where the market consists of a unique riskless asset.
Despite its apparent simplicity, it describes a common situation, since pension reserves
are frequently used to fund government expenditure due to regulatory impositions.
The differential equations that governs the dynamics of the fund is
F ′(t) = rF (t) + I(t)−G(t, g(t)), (4)
with initial condition F (0) = F0, that corresponds to a particular case of expression (2).
According to this expression, the value of the fund is incremented by the income I(t) and
decremented by the expenditure G(t, g(t)). The remainder of the fund is invested in a
riskless asset that grows at a constant rate r. Depending on the financial situation of the
system, it may be necessary to borrow funds to cover current expenditure. We assume
that borrowing and lending take place without restrictions at the same rate r.
In this setting, the sponsor of the fund controls the indexing of pensions in order to affect
the total expenditure. On the one hand, the sponsor aims to set the index factor close
the target level gc, but on the other hand, it does not want to affect in excess the budget
equilibrium.
We use dynamic programming techniques to solve the problem. Following Bellman (1957),
the corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation is
ρV (t, F )− ∂V (t, F )
∂t
= min
g(t)
{
θ
(
g(t)− gc
gc
)2
+ (1− θ)
(
F − Fc
Fc
)2
+
(
rF + I(t)
−G(t, g(t))
)
∂V (t, F )
∂F
}
,
(5)
where V (t, F ) is the value function. The income function I(t) and the expenditure
function G(t, g(t)) are assumed to be continuous and twice differentiable functions. If
φ(g(t); t, F ) denotes the argument of the minimum function above, the first-order condi-
tion yields
∂φ(g(t); t, F )
∂g(t)
=
2θ(g(t)− gc)
g2c
− ∂G(t, g(t))
∂g(t)
∂V (t, F )
∂F
= 0.
Let g∗(t) be the value of the index factor that minimizes φ(g(t); t, F ). Then, the optimal
value g∗(t) can be expressed in terms of the value function V (t, F ) and must satisfy
2θ(g∗(t)− gc)
g2c
=
∂V (t, F )
∂F
∂G(t, g(t))
∂g(t)
∣∣∣
(t,g∗(t))
.
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For the expenditure function G(t, g(t)), we assume the form
G(t, g(t)) = B(t)(1 + g(t))δ, (6)
where B(t) denotes the expenditure related to payments to beneficiaries subject to the
index factor g(t) and δ is a factor incrementing the total expenditure due to administrative
expenses (δ > 1) and other costs or transfers. Here B(t) is assumed to be a non-negative
differentiable function and the parameter δ is assumed to be constant. Nevertheless, δ
could be a variable function of time. For example, if it includes administrative expenses,
δ could be a decreasing function due to technological advances or reforms that lead to
a rationalization of the administration. Conversely, if it includes other transfers to the
beneficiaries, δ could be an increasing function of time.
Note that g(t) can be related to an instantaneous force of indexation h(s) through the
relation
(1 + g(t)) = e
∫ t
0 h(s)ds,
so that
h(t) =
g′(t)
1 + g(t)
.
Given the choice of the expenditure function, the optimal value of g(t) is given by
g∗(t) =
B(t)δg2c
2θ
∂V (t, F )
∂F
+ gc. (7)
In order to solve the HJB equation, the quadratic form of the functional suggests the use
of quadratic guessing function for V (t, F ). So, we choose
V (t, F ) = a(t)F 2 + b(t)F + c(t),
where the parameters a(t), b(t) and c(t) are functions of time to be found.
By substituting the guessing function in (5) and matching coefficients we find that the
parameter a(t) must satisfy
a′(t) =
1
θ
B(t)2δ2g2ca(t)
2 + (ρ− 2r)a(t)− 1− θ
F 2c
, (8)
with final condition a(T ) = 0. This differential equation can be identified as a Ricatti
type equation that can be solved numerically.
Also, by matching coefficients in equation (5) the parameter b(t) must satisfy
b′(t) +
(
r − ρ− 1
θ
B(t)2δ2g2ca(t)
)
b(t) = 2a(t) (B(t)δ(1 + gc)− I(t)) + 2(1− θ)
Fc
,
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with final condition b(T ) = 0. Being a linear first-order differential equation, we can
find an explicit solution for b(t). Letting p(t) = 1
θ
B(t)2δ2g2ca(t) and also letting q(t) =
2a(t) (B(t)δ(1 + gc)− I(t)) + 2(1−θ)Fc we have that
b(t) = −
∫ T
t
q(s)e(r−ρ)(s−t)−
∫ s
t p(u)duds. (9)
With respect to the parameter c(t), by matching coefficients it must satisfy the differential
equation
c′(t)− ρc(t) = 1
4θ
B(t)2δ2g2c b(t)
2 +B(t)δ(1 + gc)b(t)− I(t)b(t)− (1− θ),
with final condition c(T ) = 0. Similar to the case of b(t), the above differential equa-
tion can be identified as a linear first-order differential equation. If we let η(t) =
1
4θ
B(t)2δ2g2c b(t)
2 +B(t)δgcb(t)−I(t)b(t)− (1−θ), the solution of the differential equation
is
c(t) = −
∫ T
t
η(s)e−ρ(s−t)ds.
Once we have found the three time parameters, we have an expression for the value
function V (t, F (t)), so substituting
∂V (t, F )
∂F
in (7) we obtain
g∗(t) =
B(t)δg2c
2θ
(2a(t)F (t) + b(t)) + gc. (10)
Being F (t) of deterministic nature, it is possible to find its expression by solving the
differential equation (4) at the optimal g∗(t). So,
F ′(t) = rF (t) + I(t)−G(t, g∗(t))
= rF (t) + I(t)−B(t)
(
1 +
B(t)δg2c
2θ
(2a(t)F (t) + b(t)) + gc
)
δ,
with F (0) = F0, which can be identified as the linear first-order differential equation
F ′(t)−
(
r − B(t)
2δ2
θ
a(t)g2c
)
F (t) = I(t)−
(
B(t)δ(1 + gc) +
B(t)2δ2g2c b(t)
2θ
)
,
with solution
F (t) = F0e
∫ t
0 A(s)ds +
∫ t
0
ξ(s)e
∫ t
s A(u)duds,
where A(t) = r − B(t)2δ2
θ
a(t)g2c and ξ(t) = I(t)−B(t)δ(1 + gc)− B(t)
2δ2g2c b(t)
2θ
.
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An important observation from the results is that the value of g(t) must reach the value gc
at time T . This effect can be verified from expression (10), since a(T ) and b(T ) take the
value 0. So, the model is useful in situations where the government has a clear indexing
target to reach at the end of the planning horizon but accepts its temporary relaxation
in order to cope with a foreseeable financial imbalance.
3.2 One risky asset case
Now we extend the universe of possible investments with the inclusion of one risky asset
in the market, denoted by S(t). Its dynamics is given by
dS(t) = µS(t)dt+ σS(t)dW (t),
with initial condition S(0) = s0. This is a particular case of expression (1) corresponding
to a unique risky asset.
The fund takes into account the results from investing both in the riskless and the risky
asset, so its dynamics are given by
dF (t) = (rF (t) + α(t)F (t)(µ− r) + I(t)−G(t, g(t))) dt+ α(t)σF (t)dW (t),
with initial condition F (0) = F0. The fraction of the fund invested in the risky asset is
α(t).
As in the previous case, we first set the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation, which is
ρV (t, F )− ∂V (t, F )
∂t
= min
g(t),α(t)
{
θ
(
g(t)− gc
gc
)2
+ (1− θ)
(
F − Fc
Fc
)2
+
(
rF + α(t)F (µ− r)
+ I(t)−G(t, g(t))
)
∂V (t, F )
∂F
+
1
2
α(t)2σ2F 2
∂2V (t, F )
∂F 2
} (11)
Compared to (5), the above HJB equation incorporates an extra term to account for the
stochastic nature of the fund, caused by the risky investment.
Let φ(g(t), α(t); t, F ) denote the argument of the minimum function above. Then, the
first-order conditions are
∂φ(g(t), α(t); t, F )
∂g(t)
= 2θ
(
g(t)− gc
g2c
)
− ∂G(t, g(t))
∂g(t)
∂V (t, F )
∂F
= 0,
∂φ(g(t), α(t); t, F )
∂α(t)
= (µ− r)F ∂V (t, F )
∂F
+ α(t)σ2F 2
∂2V (t, F )
∂F 2
= 0.
If g∗(t) and α∗(t) are the value of the index factor and the fraction of fund invested in
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the risky asset that minimize φ(g(t), α(t); t, F ), the optimal values satisfy
2θ(g∗(t)− gc)
g2c
=
∂V (t, F )
∂F
∂G(t, g(t))
∂g(t)
∣∣∣
(t,g∗(t))
,
α∗(t) =
− (µ− r)
σ2F
∂V (t, F )/∂F
∂2V (t, F )/∂F 2
.
For the choice of expenditure function G(t, g(t)) = B(t)(1 + g(t))δ, the optimal value of
g(t) is given by
g∗(t) =
B(t)δg2c
2θ
∂V (t, F )
∂F
+ gc.
The guessing function for V (t, F ) is of quadratic form, so
V (t, F ) = a(t)F 2 + b(t)F + c(t).
The time parameters a(t), b(t) and c(t) are to be found by substituting the guessing
function in (11) and matching coefficients. Then, the differential equation that a(t) must
satisfy is
a′(t) =
1
θ
B(t)2δ2g2ca(t)
2 + (ρ− 2r + )a(t)− 1− θ
F 2c
,
with a(T ) = 0 and where  =
(
µ−r
σ
)2
. Note that the difference between the above
expression and (8) is the term , which can be interpreted as the square of the market
price of risk.
With respect to the function b(t), it follows
b′(t) +
(
r − ρ− − 1
θ
B(t)2δ2g2ca(t)
)
b(t) = 2a(t) (B(t)δ(1 + gc)− I(t)) + 2(1− θ)
Fc
,
with b(T ) = 0. Being a linear first-order differential equation, defining p(t) = 1
θ
B(t)2δ2g2ca(t)
and q(t) = 2a(t) (B(t)δ(1 + gc)− I(t)) + 2(1−θ)Fc we have that
b(t) = −
∫ T
t
q(s)e(r−ρ−)(s−t)−
∫ s
t p(u)duds.
Comparing the value of b(t) with expression (9), we find that the only difference comes
from the inclusion of the term  in the exponential function.
Finally, the function c(t) must satisfy the differential equation
c′(t)− ρc(t) = b(t)
2
4
(
B(t)2
θ
δ2g2c +

a(t)
)
+B(t)δ(1 + gc)b(t)− I(t)b(t)− (1− θ),
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with final condition c(T ) = 0. Letting η(t) = b(t)
2
4
(
B(t)2
θ
δ2g2c +

a(t)
)
+B(t)δ(1 + gc)b(t)−
I(t)b(t)− (1− θ), the solution of the differential equation is
c(t) = −
∫ T
t
η(s)e−ρ(s−t)ds.
So, given a trajectory of F (t), the optimal controls are given by
g∗(t) =
B(t)δg2c
2θ
(2a(t)F (t) + b(t)) + gc. (12)
and
α∗(t) =
− (µ− r) (2a(t)F (t) + b(t))
σ2F (t)2a(t)
. (13)
3.3 Multiple risky assets case
Finally we solve problem (3), subject to the complete dynamics of the fund expressed in
(2). For ease of computation we use vector notation for µ = (µ1, µ2, . . . , µm)
T , repres-
enting the column vector of expected returns. Also, let Σ = σσT , where σ is the matrix
σ = (σij), and let 1 be the unit (column) vector of dimension m.
Proceeding as in the previous cases, the HJB equation for the problem with multiple
risky assets is
ρV (t, F )− ∂V (t, F )
∂t
= min
g(t),α(t)
{
θ
(
g(t)− gc
gc
)2
+ (1− θ)
(
F − Fc
Fc
)2
+(
rF + αT (t)(µ− r1)F + I(t)−G(t, g(t))
)
∂V (t, F )
∂F
+
1
2
αT (t)Σα(t)F 2
∂2V (t, g(t))
∂F 2
}
.
(14)
The first-order conditions are
∂φ(g(t),α(t); t, F )
∂g(t)
= 2θ
(
g(t)− gc
g2c
)
− ∂G(t, g(t))
∂g(t)
∂V (t, F )
∂F
= 0,
∂φ(g(t),α(t); t, F )
∂α(t)
= (µ− r1)F ∂V (t, F )
∂F
+ Σα(t)F 2
∂2V (t, F )
∂F 2
= 0.
where φ(g(t),α(t); t, F ) denotes the argument of the minimum function in the HJB equa-
tion.
Selecting the usual functional form of the expenditure function G(t, g(t)) = B(t)(1 +
14
g(t))δ, we find the optimal value of g(t) as
g∗(t) =
B(t)δg2c
2θ
∂V (t, F )
∂F
+ gc.
The optimal value of α(t) can also be solved from the first order conditions, resulting in
α∗(t) =
−1
F
Σ−1(µ− r1) ∂V (t, F )/∂F
∂2V (t, F )/∂F 2
.
As in the previous two cases, we choose the quadratic guessing function
V (t, F ) = a(t)F 2 + b(t)F + c(t),
so that ∂V (t,F )
∂F
= 2a(t)F + b(t), ∂
2V (t,F )
∂F 2
= 2a(t) and ∂V (t,F )
∂t
= a′(t)F 2 + b′(t)F + c′(t).
Substituting these expressions and the optimal controls in the HJB equation (14), by
matching coefficients we obtain the set of differential equations relating a(t), b(t) and
c(t).
Starting with the a(t) function, matching terms in F 2 we find that it must obey
a′(t) =
1
θ
B(t)2δ2g2ca(t)
2 + (ρ− 2r + ) a(t)− 1− θ
F 2c
,
with final condition a(T ) = 0, where  = (µ−r1)TΣ−1(µ−r1). The differential equation
is of Riccati type, and can be solved numerically.
Similarly, matching terms in F in expression (14) we have that b(t) follows the linear
first-order ordinary differential equation
b′(t) +
(
r − ρ− − B(t)
2
θ
δ2g2ca(t)
)
b(t) = 2a(t) (B(t)δ(1 + gc)− I(t)) + 2(1− θ)
Fc
,
with final condition b(T ) = 0. Defining the functions p(t) and q(t) by
p(t) =
B(t)2
θ
δ2g2ca(t)
and
q(t) = 2a(t) (B(t)δ(1 + gc)− I(t)) + 2(1− θ)
Fc
,
the above linear differential equation has solution
b(t) = −
∫ T
t
q(s)e(r−ρ−)(s−t)−
∫ s
t p(u)duds.
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The solution is similar to the case of one risky asset, only modified by the value of ,
which now accounts for the market risk of the overall portfolio.
Finally, matching the rest of the terms in (14), we find that function c(t) also follows a
linear first-order differential equation, in this case
c′(t)− ρc(t) = η(t),
with c(T ) = 0, where
η(t) =
b(t)2
4
(
B(t)2
θ
δ2g2c +

a(t)
)
+B(t)δ(1 + gc)b(t)− I(t)b(t)− (1− θ).
The differential equation has the solution
c(t) = −
∫ T
t
η(s)e−ρ(s−t)ds.
So, for a given trajectory of F (t), the optimal controls are given by
g∗(t) =
B(t)δg2c
2θ
(2a(t)F (t) + b(t)) + gc.
and
α∗(t) =
− (2a(t)F (t) + b(t))
2a(t)F (t)
Σ−1(µ− r1).
Comparing the solutions of the three cases, we see that the difference arises from the
the market price of risk . In the multivariate case,  accommodates for the multivariate
nature of the market, incorporating the diversification effect provided by a larger number
of assets. In the case where there are no risky assets, the value of  turns to be 0.
4 Numerical Example
In this section, we aim to illustrate the use of the model presented in the previous sections
with a simple numerical example. We consider a hypothetical pension system to study
the optimal behaviour of the fund, the index factor and the portfolio strategy, for different
values of the parameters in the model.
4.1 Baseline case
A basic aspect of the model is the purpose to balance income and expenditure during the
specified planning horizon. So, in order to obtain numerical results, we need to stipulate
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both elements.
A general specification of expenditure is already given in expression (6)
G(t, g(t)) = B(t)(1 + g(t))δ,
but the pension roll B(t) still needs to be determined. Although a more complex decom-
position of B(t) could be established, we consider the exponential function
B(t) = B0e
(κ+λ)t,
where B0 is the expenditure at the initial time, κ defines the force of growth of the
number of pensions in the system and λ is the rate accounting for the difference between
the mean pension of new pensions with respect to exiting pensions. For the sake of this
example, we set B0 = 9,000, κ = 1% and λ = 1.5%.
Similarly, we consider an exponential function for the income of the pension system. In
this case, we define
I(t) = I0e
βt,
where I0 denotes the initial income and β accounts for the growth of income taking into
account the variation of insured salaries (both in value and number), and the variation
of transfers from the general budget to the Social Security budget, if they exist. We set
I0 = 10,000 and β = 0.03.
The structure of income and expenditure is completed defining the value of the parameter
δ, related to administrative costs and other transfers not included in B(t). We consider
these costs to account for an extra 10% of the pension expenditure, so we set δ = 1.1. This
structure reflects the general situation of pensions systems in many developed economies,
where pension expenditure increases at a faster rate than income. Under this scenario,
the value of B(t)δ will overcome the value of I(t) between the third and four year after
the initial time, and the financial imbalance will start to threaten the stability of the
system.
Using the controls at its disposal, the government may choose to temporary relax the
indexing of pensions to reduce the imbalance, or, on the contrary, decide to index the
pensions close to a target level, possibly sacrificing budget equilibrium. Depending on
the government’s preference between the two objectives, pensions will be more or less
generous.
In this example, the government aims to index the pensions at a rate of 1.5% for the next
10 years. So, the planning horizon of the problem is considered to be 10 years (T = 10),
and the corresponding target factor is gc(t) = e
0.015t − 1. Note that, according to the
model, at the end of the time period considered, T = 10, g(T ) will converge to the target
value g(T ) = e0.015T − 1, but its path along the 10 years will differ depending on the
specification of the rest of the model.
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The remaining funds can be invested in a riskless asset that yields a 1% annual return,
or in a risky asset with µ = 6% and σ = 25%, also measured in annual terms. Although
there only exists one risky asset in the market, from the results in Section 3, this is
equivalent to a market with multiple risky assets providing the same market price of risk.
Let’s assume that the government decides to assign the same weight to maintain an
stable pension indexing than to maintain a stable budget equilibrium, choosing a value
of θ = 0.5. Also, parameter ρ is set at ρ = 2%. The initial value of the fund is considered
to be equal to one year of present income, so F0 = 10,000, and the target level for the
fund is set equal to its initial value Fc = 10,000.
Now, for a given level of the fund, expressions (12) and (13) provide the optimal value of
the control variables. For the sake of this illustration, we consider the trajectory of F (t)
given by its expected value, which can be computed as
EF0 [F (t)] = F0e
∫ t
0 A(s)ds +
∫ t
0
ξ(s)e
∫ t
s A(u)duds,
where A(t) = r− − B(t)2
θ
δ2g2ca(t) and ξ(t) = I(t)−B(t)δ(1 + gc)− B(t)
2
2θ
δ2g2c b(t)− 2 b(t)a(t) .
For details on this later result, see Arnold (1974, p. 139).
Once the model is specified, we run it. Figure 1 shows the optimal trajectories obtained
for the value of the fund, F (t), the optimal index factor g(t), and the optimal fraction of
the fund invested in the risky asset, α(t).
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Figure 1: Sensibility analysis with respect to Fc.
According to the results, during the first years of application, when income is higher than
expenditure, the value of the fund mildly increases, and the index factor can stay close
to its target level. Once the financial situation begins to deteriorate, the index factor is
set lower to its target level in order to reduce total expenditure, and the fraction of the
fund invested in the risky asset increases to compensate for the reduction of fund value.
Finally, in the last years of application, expenditure overcomes income, so the value of
the fund is reduced in order to keep with the indexation, which eventually must converge
to its target level. The value of α(t) keeps increasing as the value of the fund is reduced
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in order to obtain capital gains that increase the value of the fund. Note that the last
term of α(t) is computed taking its limit, since at the exact final moment its value is
undetermined.
4.2 Sensitivity analysis
Taking as reference the baseline case, we can explore the effect of modifying some para-
meters in the optimal paths. First, the most fundamental parameter to study is θ, which
determines the relative importance of the target strategies. High values of θ (close to 1)
sacrifice financial balance for a closer indexing to its target level, whereas low values of θ
(close to 0) affect in the opposite direction. Figure 2 collects plots for five different values
of θ, being the middle one the baseline case.
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Figure 2: Sensitivity analysis with respect to parameter θ.
As expected, high values of θ result in lower fund values, since maintaining the indexing
close to its target level increases total expenditure. The higher the θ, the higher the
indexation and therefore the lower the value of the fund. On the contrary, low values of
θ imply a reduction of the indexation generosity, so the value of the fund gets close to
the desired level Fc. The lower the value of θ, the closer it gets to Fc.
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Another important parameter to be chosen by the sponsor is the value of Fc. Figure 3
shows the evolution of the optimal paths when Fc is modified.
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Figure 3: Sensitivity analysis with respect to Fc.
Now, lower values of Fc result in lower values of F (T ). Conversely, higher values of target
level Fc result in higher values of the fund at terminal time T . Therefore, lower values
of Fc permits a more generous indexing, as seen in plot (b). Note, however, that high
values of Fc produce small differences in the optimal values of g(t). The explanation of
this effect can be found in plot (c). In order to obtain a higher value of F (T ), the optimal
strategy tries to compensate the cost of indexing investing in assets with higher mean
return, meaning higher values of α(t).
The last parameter to be chosen by the sponsor is ρ. Figure 4 collects the results for
different values of the parameter. According to the plots, variations of the parameter
have little effect on the results, at least for reasonable choices of ρ.
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Figure 4: Sensitivity analysis with respect to ρ.
The model also includes parameters exogenously determined as σ. As σ increases, the
market price of risk  diminishes, and vice versa. The effect of altering the value of σ is
shown is Figure 5.
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Figure 5: Sensitivity analysis with respect to σ.
According to the results, modifications of the value of σ barely affect the optimal tra-
jectory of g(t). However, it significantly affects the optimal value of α(t): the smaller the
σ, the higher the fraction of the fund invested in the risky asset, which in turn leads to
a higher value of F (t). Note that similar changes in the value of the parameter µ would
cause the opposite effect than those of σ in the optimal paths, since as µ increases, so
does the market price of risk.
Finally, we check the effect of modifying the interest rate r in Figure 6.
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Figure 6: Sensitivity analysis with respect to r.
Increasing the value of r relative to the baseline case increases the value of the fund,
since it is invested with a higher return. At the same time, the higher value of the fund
permits a higher indexing of pensions. Also, due to the higher riskless return, the market
price of risk decreases, so the risky asset becomes less attractive and the fraction of the
fund invested in the risky asset gets smaller.
5 Conclusions
General theory on pensions systems tend to formulate models that are in immediate
equilibrium in terms of liquidity or solvency. However, results might not be socially
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acceptable when they imply a significant reduction of pensions levels, particularly in
nominal terms. In these scenarios, governments might prefer to borrow funds, particularly
in times when the cost of debt is small, and gradually delay the implementation of policies
that might hurt the generosity of the pension system.
In this paper, we have considered the situation where the sponsor of a pay-as-you-go
pension system (in this case, the government) must optimally decide, for a particular
planning horizon, the indexing of pensions while taking into account its effect on the
financial balance. Through the selection of an adequate pension indexing and investment
portfolio, the sponsor can weigh the indexing and budget equilibrium objectives to find
an optimally acceptable solution in social terms.
In the proposed model, income and expenditure functions are formulated in very wide
terms, so that results in this paper constitute a general framework where different struc-
tures of pay-as-you-go systems can fit in. In general, sources of income are not limited
to contributions, and costs are not limited to the pension roll. So, a general framework
where all cash-flows are considered is necessary to make suitable decisions regarding the
elements of the pension system.
Results on this paper have focused in situations where sponsors deal with liquidity con-
strains to index the pensions, but where eventually the indexing will reach its target
value. It is left for further research the construction of models for alternative scenarios,
in particular for those where solvency requirements have to be met. Also, results for
different dynamics of the fund, or constraints on the control variables, are left for further
research.
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